"Don't Silence Navy Chat".

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Author: Unknown

(See T. Jara, M. Lisowski, pp. 52-55, September 2003 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Derek A. Trinque, U.S. Navy â€" Commander Jara and Lieutenant Lisowski point out the growing use of chat by Navy operators and tacticians. They also correctly note that any initiative to standardize chat protocols and software must take into account the needs and operating habits of Navy users.

Chat is an excellent tool for coordination and information exchange. It should not be a replacement for tactical voice circuits. The authors lament the fact that fleet, carrier strike group (CSG), and expeditionary strike group (ESG) policies do not fully support the use of chat in lieu of tactical radio circuits. Fleet, CSG, and ESG staffs properly direct the use of voice circuits because chat has serious limitations that preclude its use as a primary communications tool at the tactical level.

Most afloat staffs embark in fleet flagships, aircraft carriers, and amphibious assault ships. These ships typically enjoy high bandwidth for their Internet protocol (IP) systems. Not all ships are this capable. Many cruiser-destroyer type ships have connectivity through extremely high frequency (EMF) Medium Data Rate (MDR). Operating the MDR capability of EHF requires the dedication of a satellite "spot beam." While a single spot beam can support multiple ships, these ships must be within a few hundred miles of the center of the beam to benefit from its bandwidth. Typically, only one spot beam is available per fleet area of responsibility. Some ships will be outside the available spot beams. The spot beams are controlled at the theater level, with users prioritized according to the nature of their missions. In addition, some ships rely on the antiquated international maritime satellite (INMARSAT-B) system for IP connectivity.

The authors identify the bandwidth limitation of INMARSAT (64 kilobytes per second, half of which is partitioned to the phone system). An additional limitation of INMARSAT is the wide variation in blockage zones found in different ship classes. At any given moment, there is no guarantee that all ships in a CSG or ESG will have IP connectivity. A ship whose INMARSAT antenna is blocked because of the ship's course will miss all chat communications until the blockage is cleared. The staff is thus forced to follow up all chat communications through voice or retransmit chat communications when the ship in question resumes an "unblocked" course.

Beyond these technical concerns, chat sometimes is tactically inappropriate. The typical ship's tactical action officer (TAO) has a laptop workstation to facilitate chat. That TAO also has at least one radio circuit and one internal communications net that he must monitor. In addition, the TAO must keep his eyes on the screens that present tactical information collated by the ship's combat information center. Typing chat conversations on a laptop, typically mounted 90 degrees away from the displays the TAO should be facing, can detract from the TAO's situational awareness. The separate coalition IP networks to which the authors refer only compound this problem because they require an additional laptop, which serves as a further source of distraction. Radio transmissions allow the TAO to pass data to higher authority more quickly and without interruption of situational awareness.

The authors make an interesting point about the dichotomy between the capabilities of chat and the policies that dictate the use of voice circuits as the primary conduits of tactical information. These policies, the authors state, are rarely followed. In fact, the most frequent violators of these policies are the staffs (strike group and destroyer squadron) embarked in aircraft carriers with near-perfect connectivity. It is unfortunately not unusual for a destroyer squadron, acting in its capacity as screen commander, to pass a tactical maneuvering signal through chat, following up with voice communications on the fleet tactical circuit only when prompted by a ship's TAO. This point is important as the ship's bridge team, the intended recipient of the tactical maneuvering signal, is not (and should not be) chatting-they are driving the ship, maintaining the surface picture, and listening to the radio.

The authors posit a situation where a "chat-approved operational or training incident" leads to mishap. In this situation, the authors state that the problem "is not with the use of chat, but with the fact that operators are working in a gray area of legal standing if and when something goes wrong." If an engagement order or, worse yet, a hold-fire order is passed through chat, and missed by the intended recipient for any of the reasons outlined above, then chat is in fact the problem.

Chat has its place in the Navy â€" mostly at the operational level. Engagement orders, maneuvering signals, changes to force protection conditions or warning and weapon control statuses, and other tactical information must continue to flow on voice circuits.